The lackluster economic recovery during the past two-and-a-half years has spurred discussion about whether a "debt overhang" and the ensuing process of deleveraging have held back consumption and the broader economy over the past few years and whether such forces will remain a headwind against economic growth for some time to come. Given that the tail of the distribution played such an important role in the financial crisis, it is important to look at highly indebted households to assess the nature and implications of the deleveraging that has occurred since the bursting of the credit bubble. This paper uses household survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine the run-up in household borrowing and subsequent deleveraging.
Introduction
The lackluster economic recovery during the past two-and-a-half years has spurred discussion about whether the United States will experience a "lost decade" as Japan did following the bursting of its own property-price bubble in the early 1990s. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) present evidence that the weakness in the U.S. economy is likely to persist for a very long time. Examining a large number of severe financial crises in developed and emerging economies, Reinhart and Rogoff document that economic slumps tend to be deep and protracted following such crises. With the authors noting that it is "beyond contention that the [recent] U.S. financial crisis [was] severe by any metric" (page 3), the implication is that our economy will share a similar fate.
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Household debt plays a key role in the narrative supporting this view. The amount of outstanding consumer loans and, especially, residential mortgage loans rose significantly in the United States during the credit boom in the early and middle part of the last decade. The subsequent sharp increase in problems making scheduled credit payments, which began before the economy fell into recession and joblessness rose, suggested that many households took on more debt during the boom than they could sustain over the long run. Many analysts think that this "debt overhang" and the ensuing process of deleveraging have held back consumption and the broader recovery over the past few years and will remain a headwind against economic growth for some time to come. However, this perspective is not strongly supported by the traditional macro indicators of household financial conditions-a reason perhaps that many policy analysts greatly underestimated the amount of risk building up in the financial system prior to the crisis. Aggregate household debt rose relative to disposable personal income in the early and mid-2000s (Figure 1 ), but it had been on an uptrend for a long time and had seen an earlier sharp increase in the mid-1980s that did not have particularly pernicious consequences. Aggregate required debt service payments also climbed during the credit boom, but at their peak in late 2007 they stood at just 14 percent of aggregate disposable personal income (Figure 2) . Moreover, the buildup in aggregate household debt in the early and mid-2000s was accompanied by a considerable increase in the value of aggregate household assets (Figure 3) . Thus, for households as a group, the increase in leverage was not very large in the run-up to the financial crisis. Indeed, the aggregate mortgage loan-to-value ratio barely budging during the frothiest part of the credit boom, only rising sharply after home prices turned down in mid-2006 (Figure 4 ).
In hindsight, we can see that one reason the traditional macro indicators of household financial conditions did not offer much warning about the coming financial crisis was that the most important developments were in the tail of the distribution of household borrowing. For example, the fairly benign macro data masked the fact that some households were taking on enormous amounts of leverage through low-down-payment loans and "piggy back" second liens taken out at the time of origination of the first mortgage. A substantial literature has now documented that most of the original mortgage distress (before households began to have problems making payments because of job losses) was concentrated among those loans. 2 Understanding what is happening in the tail of the distribution of household borrowing is equally important in assessing the nature and implications of the deleveraging that has occurred since the bursting of the credit bubble. The aggregate data show that consumption has been weak and debt declining in recent years and that the saving rate has been higher than in the pre-crisis period ( Figure 5 ). However, we do not have a good understanding of what underlies those patterns. In particular, aggregate data offer too little variation to know the degree to which the weakness in consumption reflects a response to the large declines in asset prices between 2006 and 2008 (that is, a standard wealth effect) or forces related to the amount of leverage on households balance sheets in and of itself. Unless we can distinguish between alternative explanations, it is difficult to predict how long these patterns will persist. This paper uses household survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the household-level underpinnings of the run-up in borrowing and subsequent deleveraging. These data offer a view of typical households as well as highly indebted households; they also offer a rich set of background information that can shed light both on what led some households into such precarious financial positions and what they have done subsequently to shore up their balance sheets. The resulting findings are thus a complement to the existing body of micro-data research on the mortgage crisis, nearly all of which is based on administrative financial data sources for which the background information is largely restricted to what is on a loan application. The existing research also is mostly focused on what precipitated the balance sheet distress, with relatively little attention, to date, on how the distress has influenced subsequent macroeconomic dynamics. 3 My main findings are as follows. First, the most indebted households-those in the top quintile of debt to assets-appeared to have fairly solid balance sheets as of the peak of the credit boom under the assumption that house prices would remain flat or increase going forward. Yet, high indebtedness was concentrated in areas with high realized house price growth over the preceding half-dozen years, leaving the highly indebted group particularly vulnerable to the possibility that the growth represented a bubble. Second, following the bursting of the bubble, highly indebted households had larger declines in spending than their less-indebted counterparts despite having smaller changes in net worth, suggesting that their indebtedness weighed on consumption above and beyond what would have been predicted by simple wealth effects. Regression results are consistent with this view. Not surprisingly, the highly indebted also saw larger amounts of mortgage distress in the wake of the house price bust, with nearly a fifth of them exiting homeownership altogether by 2011. Third, notwithstanding the modest improvements in the macroeconomic environment since the recession ended in mid-2009, there was essentially no reduction between 2009 and 2011 in the share of households reporting that they were somewhat or very likely to have problems making their mortgage payments over the coming year. Fourth, highly indebted households have made fairly limited progress in reducing leverage over the past few years, consistent with the view that it could take a long time to restore their balance sheets to their pre-crisis condition.
Background

Home Prices, Household Debt, and Spending
In a world where households can borrow as much as they wish, a household's spending at any given time is based on its expected lifetime resources, interest rates, and tastes. This level of spending, together with the household's current income, determines its current saving or dissaving (borrowing). If incomes are expected to rise over time until retirement, as they typically do, households in this constraint-free world will tend to take on debt, on net, when young, move into positive net worth as they age, and then run down their net worth in retirement. Of course, evidence suggests that in the real world many households cannot borrow as much as they wish. These constrained households may have to accept levels of consumption that are low relative to their lifetime resources at some points in their lives.
Households also choose how to divide their net worth, whether positive or negative, among different assets and liabilities based on expected rates of return, tax provisions, their risk preferences, and other factors. Even households with positive net worth often choose to hold some debt. This behavior arises in part because of the convenience of using credit cards, but more significantly when households want to own a home and their desired housing services correspond to a property with value exceeding the household's wealth. When a household wants to own a home whose value exceeds the household's net worth, it not only has a motivation for borrowing but also can use the home as collateral in order to create an ability to borrow that would not otherwise exist. Thus, the composition of a household's balance sheet is not purely a financial decision but also depends in part on the household's desired consumption of housing services.
Two factors appear to have been especially important to the rapid growth of U.S. household debt in the early and mid-2000s. First, ongoing financial innovation continued its long trend of broadening households' access to credit and lowering the cost of credit for households that already had access. 4 With financial regulation not keeping pace with rapid changes in the financial system, nontraditional mortgages became popular, allowing households with lower or more variable incomes, less wealth, and messier credit histories to obtain mortgages. Second, and perhaps relatedly, rapid house price appreciation fueled growth in mortgage debt and other household debt. Most notably, higher house prices increase desired spending via a wealth effect, and some of that higher spending is financed by borrowing. 5 Moreover, higher house prices increase the collateral against which constrained households can borrow in order to finance their desired spending.
The degree to which household balance sheets are leveraged is often measured by the ratio of debt to assets, or, in work focusing on housing, the ratio of homeowners' mortgage balances to the value of the underlying houses. The emphasis on such measures probably stems in part from the fact that lenders tend to focus on these ratios when setting the interest rate on loans or determining their willingness to lend altogether. In any case, such measures are closely related to the traditional leverage ratio of assets to net worth used in the corporate finance literature. If D represents debt, A represents assets, and NW represents net worth, then:
As is well known, U.S. house prices peaked on a national-average basis in mid-2006. Since their peak, prices have fallen by one-third. What happens to households' balance sheets and spending when house prices fall? The direct effect is a drop in household assets and net worth with no change in debt, leaving households more leveraged than before the price drop. The loss in wealth should lead households to spend less and therefore save more out of their current income; over time, that higher saving should push net worth back up again.
The increase in net worth could take the form of higher assets, lower debt, or some combination. There are several reasons to expect that the decline in house prices will lead to lower debt: Lower house prices mean that a household with a given net worth can live in a given house with less borrowing, and also that a household living in a given house has less collateral against which to borrow. In addition, some households may default on their mortgages when their house prices fall, which would also reduce their debt. In any event, regardless of how much net worth is rebuilt through lower debt as opposed to higher assets, one should expect a reduction in leverage purely because of traditional wealth effects.
In the past several years, the wealth effects channel may have been reinforced by various changes in the financial system and economy. In light of reduced, or more uncertain, future income, (or, in the case of variable-rate loans, about interest rates rising from their current extremely low levels), some households may be more concerned about the sustainability of their debt-service obligations. Moreover, lenders sharply tightened terms and standards on mortgages and consumer loans in the wake of the financial crisis. Although credit conditions have been gradually thawing over the past couple of years, the supply of credit remains considerably more restrictive than normal, particularly for mortgages. 6 Thus, there are a number of reasons to expect that households may be trying to reduce their debt-that is, to deleverage-as they rebuild their net worth. Moreover, if those considerations weigh heavily enough on households, they may provide an additional motivation to reduce spending and raise saving beyond that arising from a desire to rebuild net worth. If so, analysts trying to understand and forecast aggregate consumption need to study the composition of households' balance sheets as well as their net worth-and the distribution of assets and debt across households probably affects aggregate consumption as well. If not, however, then analysts can stick with economists' traditional focus on households' net worth and not worry about other aspects of their balance sheets.
Aggregate data do not speak clearly about whether deleveraging is affecting the pace of consumer spending and the overall economic recovery independent of the effects of the loss in household wealth. On average over the past two years, the personal saving rate has been running about 3½ percentage points above the lows seen in 2005, but this rise falls short of what would be expected based on wealth effects alone and so does not offer obvious evidence in support of the view that additional debt-related forces are restraining consumption. Assuming a marginal propensity to consume of 0.04, the decline of 1.3 in the aggregate wealth-to-income ratio between its peak in mid-2007 and the average for the last two years ( Figure 6 ) should have raised the saving rate by 5 percentage points.
7 Of course, additional forces are probably boosting consumption and reducing saving-such as low interest rates and consumption-smoothing during the economic slump-but yet other forces-such as the shift of national income away from labor income and toward capital income-should be holding consumption back. 8 Thus, aggregate data, by themselves, do not provide sufficient guidance for thinking about the influence of household debt on macroeconomic developments.
Previous Literature
Relatively little attention was given to household debt issues prior to the recent crisis. Much of the literature was focused on whether credit constraints explained the excess sensitivity of aggregate consumption to aggregate income (see, for example, Ludvigson, 1999) . At the household level, Johnson and Li (2007) found that the consumption of households with low 6 See Bernanke (2012) . 7 Davis and Palumbo (2001) estimate time-series models of consumption and conclude that consumption rises by 3 to 6 cents for every dollar that wealth increases. 8 In order to fully understand the effect on the saving rate of changes in the distribution of income in recent years, one needs to look beyond the shares going to labor and capital to the distribution of labor and capital income. Households at the very top of the income distribution have seen a much larger percentage drop in their income than households lower in the income distribution (see http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/250.html#table7), which could have a meaningful effect on the aggregate saving rate. liquid assets and high debt service burdens was more sensitive to income than the consumption of households with just low liquid assets. There was also some interest in the role of appreciating homes as collateral for borrowing-constrained households, particularly as house prices began to rise rapidly early in the 2000s (see, for example, Iacoviello, 2004) . But, some research from previous decades did give heed to the possible role of household debt in economic downturns. For example, Mishkin (1977) argued that fears of excessive debt-service burdens induced a deleveraging that contributed to the severity of the 1973-75 recession.
Much more research has been focused on household debt, particularly mortgages, since the financial crisis. This newer literature includes papers that look at the early rise in defaults among subprime borrower (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009) , the interplay between the borrower's choice to default and the lender's choice to modify, (Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen, 2009) , strategic defaults among underwater borrowers, (Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan, 2010) , and the relationship between defaults and securitization (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010) . The research has yielded a number of interesting and important findings.
Yet, nearly all of the more recent work has used mortgage records or credit bureau data. Those data sources have shed light on important issues regarding the crisis, but they have their shortcomings. Most notably, the background information about the debt holders is typically limited to what one would find on a loan application. Researchers have partly mitigated this problem by merging additional data such as average income by zip code, but the potential for such merges is limited and the information is still not household-specific. An important strength of the household survey data set used in my analysis is that it provides rich background information about the borrowers that I study.
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In addition, most of the past work has been backward-looking, aimed at exploring the causes of credit distress. There has been fairly little work that ties credit distress and, especially, deleveraging to economic activity. 10 Two notable exceptions are papers by and Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2011) , which look at employment and spending patterns in counties with different degrees of leverage on household balance sheets. One limitation of these papers is that the counties with the most leverage also tend to be the counties with the largest house price declines, so it is unclear whether their finding of soft recent economic activity reflects a special deleveraging effect or a traditional wealth effect. In addition, Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2012) provide empirical evidence that supports a link between measures of credit availability and aggregate consumption.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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Background
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is the primary data source for this analysis. The PSID is a panel survey of households, with the most recently released full wave containing information from about 8,000 interviews conducted in 2009. In February 2012, a very limited set of preliminary data from the 2011 wave of the PSID was released. The data include the information needed to construct net worth as well as the results from the mortgage distress module. The documentation cautions that the data are subject to revision. However, given the importance of using timely information for the questions at hand, I make use of the data in the analysis below.
Households participating in the PSID were surveyed every year when the survey began in 1968, but beginning with the 1995 wave, the frequency was changed to every other year. In contrast to the financial records that have been used for much of the work to date on the mortgage crisis, the PSID has comprehensive background information about borrowers' income, labor supply, and demographic characteristics.
The PSID contains fairly extensive information about mortgages on primary residences as well as loans used to finance motor vehicle purchases. Balances on other common types of household debt-such as credit cards, student loans, medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives-were reported as a group until 2011, when the questionnaire was changed to collect more detail. The PSID also has some information about assets and about net equity in businesses, vehicles, and second homes, so one can create a limited measure of households' net worth.
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Expenditures on food and a few other items are available for most waves of the survey; questions about many more categories of spending were added between 1999 and 2005 such that a broad (though not still complete) measure of consumption can be constructed for the 2005, 2007, and 2009 waves. In 2009, a module was added on mortgage distress that included information such as a household's experience with foreclosures and loan modifications as well as a household's expectations about whether it might face mortgage payment problems in the future.
I calculate the mortgage debt of each household as the sum of the balances of any first and second mortgages on its primary residence. I calculate consumer debt as the sum of outstanding balances on up to three vehicle loans (backed out from information on the original balance of the loans and the payment history) plus the reported sum of balances on other types of consumer loans. Debt service obligations are derived from information on required loan payments, except for the "other loan" category where, because much of this debt is presumably credit card debt, I follow the Federal Reserve's convention of assuming the required monthly payment is 2.5 percent of the balance.
12 I calculate the net worth of each household as the sum of the values of its primary residence, its private annuities and individual retirement accounts, any 11 The survey asks for very little information about pensions and retirement saving. It also excludes some more unusual types of assets and liabilities. 12 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/about.htm.
other stocks or bonds it holds, its mutual fund and bank accounts, and its net equity in businesses, vehicles, and second homes-minus the household's mortgage debt and its nonvehicle-related consumer debt.
For income, I use total family income before taxes. I set non-housing consumption equal to the sum of spending on vehicles, vehicle-related items, gasoline, transportation, furniture, clothing, tuition, other-school related items, and food (both at home and away from home). One complication is that the time period over which the expenditures are supposed to be reported varies by category, from "an average week" to the previous month to the previous year. In constructing a non-housing consumption measure, I adjust spending for all of the components to be on an annual basis and add them together, essentially ignoring the time mismatch.
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I augment the PSID data with state-level information in order to better capture the macroeconomic conditions faced by each household. Specifically, I add state population and state unemployment rates. I also add indexes of state house prices produced by CoreLogic, a private firm that collects and distributes consumer, financial, and property information.
The calculations presented throughout the paper are based on weighting the PSID observations. I use the longitudinal weights provided by the PSID for the core sample of households combined with the additional sample of immigrant families.
Further information about the construction of the data set is presented in a separate appendix. Table 1 shows some summary statistics for the households in the sample. All responding households from each wave are included, although, for some variables, such as consumption and net worth, some observations are missing because the household did not report full data for the variable or its components. I show medians instead of means so as to avoid the influence of unduly large readings, particularly for balance sheet variables. The credit cycle seen in aggregate data appears to some extent in the PSID data as well. The fractions of households in this sample holding mortgage debt and vehicle debt fell between 2007 and 2009. Median vehicle debt for households holding such debt also declined between 2007 and 2009, but median mortgage debt for households with mortgage debt increased over that period. This pattern may reflect new homeowners, who tend to purchase smaller houses, being shut out of the market-indeed, Bhutta (2012) found that first-time homebuying has been historically weak. It may also reflect the possibility that the credit crunch was felt mostly in the tails of the distribution, at least at the beginning.
Summary Statistics on Household Balance Sheets and Consumption
The table also shows some clear limitations of the data. In particular, median net worth is only about half as large as in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is widely considered to be the best available data on U.S. household balance sheets. 16 The discrepancy likely owes in large part to the fact that the PSID collects data on only a limited part of total household wealth. Indeed, Bosworth and Smart (2009) present a thorough comparison of the PSID and the SCF and conclude that, once put on a comparable basis, the wealth measures in the two surveys are very similar through the 95 th percentile of the wealth distribution.
Another issue raised by Table 1 is that median nonhousing consumption seems low relative to median before-tax income. Again, the explanation may be the limited scope of the questions. Li, Schoeni, Danziger, and Charles (2010) find that the information from many of the consumption categories added since 1999 compares favorably with estimates from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In any event, to the extent that the movements in these partial measures are correlated with movements in more comprehensive measures, the results presented below should generalize to consumption as a whole.
Household Debt and Spending during the Credit Boom
To lay the groundwork for the analysis of deleveraging, I examine how households accumulated so much debt during the boom. Table 2 presents a comparison of the characteristics of households based on their financial positions as of the 2007 wave of the PSID. These households were interviewed before the national economy went into recession and before aggregate household debt started to decline in the second half of 2008 (although signs of trouble in the subprime mortgage sector had emerged well before then).
Households with retired heads are excluded from the comparison. Because those households are at a different point in their lifecycles, their financial positions and behavior may differ from those of other households in a variety of ways. Most notably, normalizing key variables by household income, as I do below, makes much less sense for households whose current income (in retirement) is so far below their permanent income.
The table separates homeowners from non-homeowners. The liabilities of the former group tend to be dominated by mortgage debt, which is associated with a housing asset that affects borrowing in various ways (as discussed above) and that experienced a remarkable surge and then drop in value for many households. To capture this latter feature, the table further divides homeowners by whether they live in a state that was in the top quartile of house-price appreciation between 2000 and 2006-called "boom states" here.
17 Given housing's role as an asset, one might expect housing-related debt to behave very differently in areas where the housing sector is booming, particularly if people tend to forecast future home prices based on past trends.
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Within the categories of non-homeowners, homeowners in non-boom states, and homeowners in boom states, the table presents separate estimates for highly indebted households and other households, in order to explore whether the behavior of those two types of households differs significantly. I define highly indebted households within each homeowner group as those in the top quintile of that group (on a weighted basis) for the ratio of debt to assets. For nonhomeowners, I use total debt-which effectively means consumer debt such as auto loans, credit card balances, and student loans-divided by total assets. For homeowners, I use mortgage debt divided by the value of a household's primary residence. Using this more restricted measure of leverage allows me to retain more households for the analysis, as there are many cases where full data on other types of assets and liabilities are not available. 19 In later tables, I sometimes identify highly indebted households on the basis of the ratio of their debt service obligations to their disposable income rather than the ratio of their debt to their assets.
The first two columns of Table 2a and Table 2b present estimates for non-homeowners. Compared with homeowners, shown in the remaining four columns, non-homeowners are less affluent, with considerably lower levels of income, consumption, and net worth. For highly indebted non-homeowners, the median amount of consumer debt in 2007 was $20,000, whereas the median amount of consumer debt for other non-homeowners was zero. Along many other dimensions, the two groups summarized in the first two columns look fairly similar. For example, median levels of before-tax income and nonhousing consumption in 2007 were about the same, and both groups had a few hundred dollars of financial assets at the median. With the increase between 2005 and 2007 in the median ratio of consumer debt to income for the highly indebted group (shown in Table 2b ) only about one-quarter as large as the median 2007 ratio, it appears that many of the highly indebted have been so for a while. This result could indicate a chronic shortfall of self-control by some households, but it could also reflect fully rational behavior for households that expect their income to be much higher in the future because, for example, they are in a profession where income rises sharply with tenure. Note that highly indebted non-homeowners are considerably more likely to have a college degree than other nonhomeowners. More education might increase the credit use of this group in two ways: first, because it is associated with greater access to credit, and, second, because the people with more education tend to have steeper age-income profiles.
As can be seen in the third and fourth columns of the Table 2a , highly indebted homeowners in states outside the top quartile of the housing boom tended to be younger and to have (slightly) lower income and smaller homes than homeowners in those states with less debt in 2007. At the median, the consumption of the highly indebted homeowners in those states was a little higher relative to income than the consumption of other homeowners. Both the mortgage debt and consumer debt of the highly indebted group were considerably higher; at the median, mortgage debt amounted to nearly two years' worth of income for that group versus eight months for less-indebted homeowners. The median ratio of mortgage debt to home value was 0.88 for highly indebted homeowners, more than twice that for other homeowners. For the highly indebted, monthly debt obligations represented 28 percent of pre-tax income at the median, and roughly a fifth of them had become homeowners over the preceding two years.
Turning again to Table 2b , relative to two years earlier, the homeowners in these nonboom states who were not highly indebted had improved their balance sheets significantly, with no increase in debt and an increase in the median ratio of net worth to income of 0.26. In contrast, the highly indebted group experienced an increase in mortgage debt equal to about three months' worth of income at the median. Even for this group, though, the median ratio of net worth to income increased between 2005 and 2007, and the median ratio of consumer debt to income edged down.
The most striking comparison in Tables 2a and 2b is between highly indebted homeowners and other homeowners in the states with the largest housing booms, shown in the fifth and sixth columns. The highly indebted households again tended to be younger, but had considerably less pre-tax income at the median than households in those states that were not highly indebted ($77,000 versus $93,000). Yet, median nonhousing consumption for this group was somewhat higher ($28,000 versus $25,000). For both the highly indebted households and other households, housing was a much more important part of the balance sheet than in states that saw lower rates of house price appreciation, with the median mortgage debt and home values in the fifth and sixth columns about double the corresponding figures in the third and fourth columns.
More than a quarter of the 2007 highly indebted homeowners in the housing boom states had entered homeownership since 2005 (Table 2b) . Mortgage debt for the group grew sharply between 2005 and 2007, with homeowners taking on debt equal to more than a year's worth income at the median; other homeowners in those states saw little change at the median. Despite this increase, the 2007 financial positions of highly indebted households in housing boom states likely seemed solid to those that did not anticipate the housing bust: Median net worth relative to income had risen by 0.13 over the preceding two years, and the median ratio of mortgage balance to home value was 0.84. Note, though, that the typical highly indebted household in a boom state in 2007 had low levels of financial assets relative to other households in those states, and they had debt service obligations that amounted to 34 percent of pre-tax income in 2007-much higher than for households with less debt and for highly indebted households in non-boom states. Such a household would likely have trouble making mortgage payments if faced with an unanticipated disruption to income, but appeared to have a sufficient equity cushion to sell its home and pay off the mortgage should such a shock occur.
In boom states, the highly indebted homeowners in boom states were slightly less likely to have a college degree than those with less debt-in contrast with the pattern for homeowners in other states and for non-homeowners. 20 To the extent that less-educated households are more likely to be lured into taking on precariously high levels of debt because of a lack of financial sophistication, one would expect the difference between the median education levels of highly indebted people and other people to be the same for homeowners in boom and non-boom states and for homeowners and non-homeowners (all else equal). However, credit access was probably higher for homeowners in boom states than for other people, because lenders believed that 20 The difference is even larger if one separates households according to who took on the most leverage over the past two years. In boom states, 37 percent of the top quintile of households by changes in leverage had a college degree, compared with 45 percent of other households.
continued rapid house price appreciation would make it easier for households to meet their debt obligations. Together with a lack of financial sophistication on the part of less educated people, this effect would produce the pattern observed in these data. The panels on the left show that there was a slight negative relationship between the leverage of a state's homeowners and the house price appreciation it saw during the boom. Rapidly rising house prices pushed down the median ratio of mortgage debt to house value, leaving most households in the housing boom states with reasonable equity cushions. For example, even households at the 90 th percentile of reported leverage in most of those states appeared to be able to withstand a 10 percent decline in the value of their houses without the house value falling below the value of the mortgage. However, the higher rates of house price appreciation in these states means that the declining ratio of mortgage value to house price masked a marked run-up in debt. As can be seen in the panels on the right, the ratio of mortgage debt in 2007 to the estimated value of the underlying home in 2000 rises sharply with the size of the housing boom, particularly at the high end of the debt distribution. In part, this pattern reflects new homeowners entering a housing market that was more expensive than that facing their predecessors. However, most highly indebted homeowners in those states were not new to homeownership. 21 Those households likely increased their mortgage leverage by extracting equity through home equity lines of credit and cash-out refinancing transactions and by taking on larger mortgages as they turned one home over for the next.
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Several broad patterns emerge from the results in this section. The typical highly indebted non-homeowner at the peak of aggregate household indebtedness in 2007 had income and nonhousing consumption that were fairly similar to those of the typical non-homeowner with less debt. However, that highly indebted household had a decidedly weaker financial position than the household with less debt, with much lower net worth relative to income. Moreover, over the preceding two years, the median net worth relative to income for highly indebted non-homeowners had declined, and the median debt relative to income had increased but by a small amount. For homeowners, the situation differed in several ways during that period. The typical highly indebted homeowner had higher nonhousing consumption relative to income in 2007 than did the typical homeowner with less debt. Yet, over the preceding two years, the median net worth relative to income for highly indebted homeowners increased, and the median debt relative to income increased considerably. Home prices appear to have figured prominently in those patterns, as the differences are much more pronounced in states where house prices had risen rapidly. 23 Highly indebted homeowners in states with housing booms saw an enormous increase in median debt relative to income, leaving them very exposed to a decline in house prices.
Deleveraging and its Consequences
I now turn to the question of what happened to highly indebted households following the financial crisis and the onset of the recession. Tables 3a and 3b have columns that are defined like those in Tables 2a and 2b. Households that were highly indebted in 2007 are again compared to households that had less debt in 2007, with separate comparisons for non-homeowners, homeowners in states that were in the top quartile of house price appreciation during the housing boom, and homeowners in other states.
In Table 3a , highly indebted households are identified in the same way as in Tables 2a  and 2b, Table 1 and appears in aggregate data. In addition, median nonhousing consumption relative to income declined between 2007 and 2009 for all six groups, and median debt relative to income declined for all three groups of highly indebted households.
One feature that stands out is the greater decline in consumption seen by the high-debt homeowners relative to their counterparts with less debt. This pattern is particularly evident in the housing boom states, where the consumption of the median household in the highly indebted group fell by 15 percent-about twice as much as the median for other households. The number of vehicles owned fell as well, where as the number of vehicles owned by lower debt households was about flat.
Of course, this simple comparison does not begin to control for all of the factors that might be influencing the consumption of these different groups, most notably wealth, which moved dramatically over the period. A more refined take on the question comes from comparing the relative movements of C/Y and W/Y. For lower-debt households in housing boom states, at the median, W/Y declined by 0.83 and C/Y declined by 0.04. At face value, these figures suggest a marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth of 0.05-remarkably close to the range that is often cited by policymakers! But, for high-debt households, C/Y moved by much more (twice as much) relative to the amount that would be implied by applying a typical marginal propensity to the wealth loss. So, the pattern is consistent with the view that having a high loanto-value ratio has damped consumption above and beyond the weakness that would be implied by wealth effects alone. Comparing the figures for high-debt households in non-boom states to those in boom states yields qualitatively similar patterns. 24 To draw strong conclusions on this point, however, one should control for the various ways in which households that have a lot of debt are different from other households; I attempt to do so below with regression analysis.
The second feature that stands out in the homeowner comparisons is the greater degree of mortgage distress experienced by homeowners that had a lot of debt relative to assets in 2007. Not surprisingly, the top quintiles of such households were much more likely by 2009 to have had problems or to anticipate having problems making their mortgage payments. Specifically, in housing boom states, 19 percent of highly indebted homeowners were behind on their mortgage payments versus 3 percent of other homeowners in those states. The comparable figures for states that saw lower amounts of house prices appreciation during the housing boom were 11 percent and 2 percent. Highly indebted households were also more likely to have experienced a foreclosure filing, to have had their mortgage modified, and to have reported being very or somewhat likely to fall behind on their mortgage payments over the coming year. In both boom and non-boom states, more than a fifth of highly indebted households moved between 2007 and 2009, more than double the rate for households with less debt, and 8 to 10 percent had exited homeownership altogether. Those figures suggest that an important way that some highly indebted households reduced their debt was by downsizing or defaulting.
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I noted earlier that, for some households, the strains of having large amounts of debt may manifest themselves primarily through the large debt service payments required each month. In the bottom panel of Table 3 , I identify highly indebted households as those in the top quintile of 24 Note that the results hinge in part on the highly indebted having smaller declines in the net worth than other homeowners, which raises the question of whether measurement error is coming into play-whether some households ended up in the highly indebted group because they over-reported debt in 2007 and the observed decline in debt (and any corresponding increase in net worth) between 2007 and 2009 simply reflects a return to a more accurate reading. Like all household surveys, the PSID undoubtedly suffers from measurement error. But, there are several factors that argue against measurement error being particularly important here. First, it should not be that difficult for households to recall the balances on one or two mortgages, particularly given that they are encouraged to draw from financial records for their PSID interviews. Second, only a very large amount of misreporting would affect the median of the top quintile. Third, one should expect a smaller decline in net worth for the top quintile, given the figures in Table 2 that suggest that households in this group had smaller homes and lower financial assets, and the figures in Table 3 that suggest that the states where those households lived experienced smaller declines in home prices. 25 As noted in Dynan (2011) , information about aggregate charge-offs suggests that the dollar volume of defaults on household debt is about two-thirds as large as the total decline in household debt since 2008. Using credit bureau data and taking into account pre-crisis norms for mortgage-related flows, Bhutta (2012) finds that defaults are important, but that weak new borrowing has actually been much more important in holding down aggregate debt over the past two years. For more discussion of the importance of defaults, see Woodward and Hall (2012) and Hall (2012) . 2007 debt service payments relative to income. 26 In this panel it is more difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of deleveraging above and beyond the effects of wealth. Households that were highly indebted by this measure saw a larger decline in their median nonhousing consumption relative to income than their less indebted counterparts, but, in the case of homeowners in boom states, also saw a bigger decline in their median net worth relative to income. Measures of realized mortgage distress are the same or lower for the high debt-service burden households as for high leverage households. However, households with high debt service in boom states seemed more likely to anticipate distress than households with high mortgage-tohouse values ratios, with nearly a third of them reporting that they were somewhat or very likely to fall behind on their mortgage payments over the coming year.
Formalizing the Results
The central question of interest is whether the debt overhang is holding back consumption growth. In particular, I seek to answer whether the rise in leverage induced by the drop in home prices has reduced consumption by an amount that is greater than the change in wealth multiplied by the typical marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. The results in Table 3a are supportive of the notion that the debt overhang has represented an additional headwind. I test the hypothesis more formally using regression analysis.
The discussion in Section 2 noted the relationship between a household's consumption and its wealth predicted by the lifecycle model, but also discussed how balance sheet variables might matter separately. In particular, high leverage might reduce a household's consumption if it is targeting a lower level of leverage or if financial institutions' willingness to lend to the household depends on the leverage it already has. Similarly, the burden associated with debt service obligations might matter for the willingness or the ability of households to borrow. For both leverage and debt service, an overshooting of the level the household considers optimal could occur because the household was overly optimistic about where the value of their assets (in the case of leverage) or income (in the case of the debt service burden) was heading. Or, the household's target for leverage or debt service burden might decline. For example, Mishkin (1977) argued that an increase in the probability of job loss might induce a household to reduce its debt service obligations because it fears the consequences of defaulting on its debt; such a dynamic has been formalized more recently in the model presented by Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2012) . where corresponds to the change in the consumption of household i, to the change in its wealth, is its leverage, and is the fraction of income going toward debt service payments. is a vector of other variables that might to influence household consumption growth such as the interest rate, the risk of job loss, the change in current income (relevant for households that are liquidity constrained or myopic), and demographic factors (which might be correlated with time preference). As in Table 3a , the changes represent differences between the 2007 and 2009 waves of the PSID. Both leverage and debt service are measured as of the beginning of the period over which the change is calculated because, presumably, it is the household's ex ante level of balance sheet distress that is relevant for its consumption. If the debt overhang did hold back consumption growth between 2007 and 2009 above and beyond what would be typical given the drop in wealth, one would expect to see negative coefficients on the balance sheet variables.
Several complications present themselves. First, there are models that could produce a negative or even in the absence of a separate channel related to the degree of leverage or debt burden. Most notably, if time preference rates vary across households, marginal propensities to consume might tend to be higher for low-wealth households because these households are likely to be more impatient. In this case, one would expect low-wealth homeowners to have a larger consumption response to the house price bust. Since debt and, especially, leverage are highly correlated with wealth, the coefficients on these variables would be biased downward. To shed light on whether my results are being biased by such effects, I estimate regressions for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] . Given that house prices rose, on net, over this period, one would expect to see positive coefficients on the debt variables in these specifications if households with low wealth simply have higher marginal propensities to consume; if the coefficients continue to be negative, the results are consistent with the view that high debt tends to damp consumption. Second, the timing of the data is not ideal for estimating equation (2). Although house prices at the national level had been falling for about a year by the time the 2007 wave of the PSID was launched, they continued to decline rapidly for much of the period between the 2007 and 2009 waves. As a result, the degree of debt overhang that may have induced some households to pare back their consumption between 2007 and 2009 is likely understated by the ex ante measures. However, it is undesirable to simply use ex post (2009) levels of debt variables in the equation because they may be correlated with the consumption change simply because debt is often used to finance consumption and (relatedly) because the debt variables are endogenous with respect to any deleveraging the household has done. For this reason, I try splitting the sample based on whether the household resided in a housing boom state because those states also tended to see the largest housing busts such that leverage saw a sharper increase. I also try projecting 2009 levels of leverage by combining information about households' 2007 leverage with subsequent house price growth in their state.
Third, given the noisiness of household data, the small size of the PSID sample is likely to make the estimates imprecise, particularly in cases where I focus on just a subset of the sample. Using broad measures of leverage and debt burden would reduce the sample size considerably because a number of households do not report all of the information needed to calculate total debt, total assets, or total service obligations. Hence, I focus on mortgage-related measures of debt and assets, which are available for most households.
Finally, I follow a long tradition in the empirical literature examining household-level consumption and finances by using a transformation that downweights large values; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) provide a formal justification for doing so by showing that the residuals from a linear regression using household data are far from normal. Using log differences in equation (2) is not desirable because it would require dropping households with negative readings for wealth, a group highly relevant to the question at hand. Instead, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine of consumption, income, and wealth before differencing. For a variable x it , the inverse hyperbolic sine is defined as: (3) Except in the case of very small values, the transformed variable can be interpreted like a logarithmic variable (see Burbidge, Magee, and Robb, 1988, and Pence, 2006 , for more discussion). The drawback to moving away from a linear specification, however, is that one cannot interpret the coefficients on the income and wealth changes as marginal propensities to consume. For this reason, I estimate some specifications that are more in the spirit of the calculation done for Table 3a 
Regression Results
Given that mortgage leverage and mortgage debt service obligations are likely to be correlated, I begin with regressions that include just one measure or the other. Table 4 shows estimates based on equation (2) featuring 2007 mortgage leverage as the debt variable. The dependent variable is the change in nonhousing consumption over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] . In the baseline specification, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is applied to consumption, income, and wealth before taking changes, and the changes are also multiplied by 100 so that they roughly corresponds to percent changes. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the leverage measure, the changes in income and wealth, and the change in the unemployment in the household's state of residence; a constant, head age, whether the head has a college degree, the level of income, and the level of the state unemployment rate are also included in the regression, but the coefficients are not shown.
In the baseline specification, the estimated coefficient on the change in income has the expected positive sign and is highly statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on the change in wealth also has the expected positive sign and is highly statistically significant. Conditional on the other variables, the change in the state unemployment rate is not significant, nor is the level of state unemployment rate (which is not shown). One might have expected these variables to have a significant negative relationship with consumption given that Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2012) concluded that heightened uncertainty about job loss has induced a sizable precautionary saving response that has been weighing on consumption. Most other specifications tried show similar results for the changes in income, wealth, and state unemployment (although I note a few exceptions below).
The estimated coefficient on mortgage leverage in the baseline specification is negative and statistically significant at about the 6 percent level, suggesting that, even after controlling for wealth effects, higher leverage did indeed weigh on consumption over the 2007-2009 period. At face value, the point estimate, -6.1, suggests the effect could be material: if one interprets the difference in the inverse hyperbolic sine (multiplied by 100) as the percent change, the estimate implies that an increase in a household's mortgage loan-to-value ratio from 1 to 1.10 would have reduced its consumption growth by 0.6 percentage point over this two-year period.
In column (2), I replace the changes in consumption, income, and wealth with the firstdifference divided by average income over the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , multiplied by 100. Unfortunately, the coefficient on the change in wealth is not precisely estimated, so the data are not helpful in uncovering the average marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. At 0.005, the point estimate on the change in wealth looks small relative to the conventional belief that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is a few cents on the dollar (or even more), but the estimated coefficient is likely attenuated by measurement error in the PSID wealth data.
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Mortgage leverage again has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. (5) present estimates of the baseline specification for different subgroups of the PSID sample. Starting with the homeowner sample, which is about 40 smaller than the full sample, the estimated coefficient on mortgage leverage is similar to that in the baseline specification. However, it is only statistically significant at the 18 percent level because the standard error is much larger, which would be expected given the smaller sample size. Likewise, the standard errors are yet larger when the homeowner sample is split by whether the household resided in a state in the top quartile of house price appreciation between 2000 and 2006. Although not statistically significant, the estimates in columns (4) and (5) suggest that leverage weighed much more on consumption in housing boom states than in other states. 28 This pattern may reflect the fact that ex ante leverage understates any leverage-induced distress by more in the boom state since the subsequent house price depreciation was larger in those states. I return to this issue with columns (7) and (8).
Columns (3) through
I next vary the measure of leverage. In column (6), I replace mortgage leverage with a dummy variable indicating whether a household is in the top quintile of mortgage leverage; the estimate on this dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 9 percent level. In column (7), I replace 2007 mortgage leverage with 2009 mortgage leverage. As discussed above, given that much of the house price bust occurred after the 2007 wave of the PSID, the ex post measure should better capture the mortgage distress relevant to the 2007-2009 change in consumption. However, the problem with the ex post measure is that, to the extent that credit was still flowing over this period, some households likely borrowed more over the period in order to increase their consumption. For these households, one might expect a positive relationship between ex post leverage and consumption. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the estimated coefficient on leverage in this specification falls (in an absolute sense) to around 0. In column (8), I attempt to circumvent the bias induced by the endogeneity of debt with respect to consumption by instrumenting 2009 leverage with 2007 leverage as well as state-level house price growth. In this specification, the estimated coefficient is a bit higher than in the baseline, at -7.8, and statistically significant at the 6 percent level.
Column (9) shows the results when the regression is estimated for the 2005-2007 change in nonhousing consumption. One interpretation of my results thus far is that leverage itself somehow damps consumption, but an alternative explanation for the negative coefficients on leverage for the 2007-09 period is that low-wealth households are more sensitive to wealth changes and that higher leverage is simply proxying for lower wealth. If this alternative explanation were correct, however, one would expect a positive coefficient on the leverage variable over the 2005-07 period when wealth was rising. The data speak against this alternative, as the coefficient and standard error on the leverage term are quite similar to that in the baseline case for the 2007-09 period. Most other coefficients in the two regressions are also similar, although the estimated coefficient on the change in the state unemployment rate is much larger and statistically significant at the 9 percent level for the 2005-07 regressions. Column (10) shows the results when the data are pooled (with a dummy variable for observations from the 2009 wave added); the estimated coefficient on leverage is -5.4 and statistically significant at the 2 percent level. Table 5 presents regressions where the debt variable is the 2007 mortgage debt service burden, defined as the ratio of annual mortgage debt service obligations to pre-tax household income. All other features of the baseline specification are the same. The estimated coefficient on the debt service burden in the baseline specification is -6.1 and is statistically significant at the 6 percent level; at face value, this estimate would imply that, on average and all else equal, for every additional 10 percent of a household's income going toward debt service payments one would expect its 2007-2009 consumption growth to have been 0.6 percentage points lower. The negative coefficient shows up across the variants on the specification, with varying degrees of significance. Among the more notable results in the next few columns, one again sees a stronger effect in boom states than non-boom states.
In columns (7) and (8), I shows results for specifications where an additional terms corresponding to the interaction between the debt service burden and the level of the state unemployment rate is added in order to explore the hypothesis that a higher debt service burden is more likely to cause a retrenchment in consumption with the risk of job loss is high. To make space for these variants, I drop the regressions that explore the results when ex post measures of debt are added; these specifications are less interesting in this case because one would not expect the same sort of dramatic change in debt service as for leverage over the 2007-2009 period. Although, one might expect negative coefficients on the interaction terms under the hypothesis above, the coefficients are positive and insignificant. Columns (9) show the estimates for the 2005-07 period, as well as for the pooled sample. As in Table 4 , the negative effect of high indebtedness appears to prevail for the earlier period, although it is somewhat weaker.
Finally, Table 6 shows the results when both 2007 mortgage leverage and 2007 mortgage debt service burden are included in the regression. Doing so might be informative as to which debt variable is actually driving the relationship, which, it turn, could shed light on the underpinning of the relationship and have also have possible policy implications. As one might expect given the correlation between the two variables, none of the coefficients are very precisely estimated. Moreover, the coefficients on the variables are largely similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 . However, the coefficient on the debt service burden is close to 0 when the equation is estimated for the 2005-2007 period, suggesting that, at least during the boom, debt service obligations did not crowd out consumption after controlling for leverage. Such a pattern could be explained by the ease with which most homeowners were able to refinance and extract equity during the boom should they have run into cash-flow problems.
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On the whole, the regression analysis is limited by somewhat large standard errors, which are likely the result of the small size of the PSID sample and the noisiness of the data. Still, the fairly consistent pattern of marginally significant negative coefficients on the debt variables is supportive of the view that the debt overhang produced by the drop in house prices represents an additional headwind for consumption-above and beyond the direct wealth effects associated with lower house prices. Moreover, the size of the coefficients suggests that the effect could be meaningful.
More Recent Evidence about the Highly Indebted
The Evolution of Mortgage Distress
As discussed earlier, preliminary data from the 2011 wave of the PSID have recently been released. The data are subject to revision and represent just a small subset of the variables that will ultimately be available. The mortgage distress and balance sheet variables are included in the data that were released, but information about income, demographics, and consumption is not. Still, with even the earlier interviews occurring just a year ago and some occurring just a few months ago, the data are highly timely and worth exploring. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the various mortgage distress variables for the same groups of households examined earlier that owned homes as of 2007. Broadly speaking, it remained the case in 2011 that the homeowners who had the highest ratios of mortgage debt to home value in 2007 were under considerably more strain than their counterparts who had less debt in 2007. It also remained the case that the distress was more pronounced in the "housing boom" states, the top quartile of states that saw the most home price appreciation between 2000 and 2006.
The top left panel of the figure shows a small decline in the fraction of highly indebted households that were behind on their mortgage payments between 2009 and 2011. This pattern is consistent with the decline in mortgage delinquency rates seen in aggregate data. The number of highly indebted homeowners in housing boom states who were in foreclosure rose between 2009 and 2011, as shown in the top right panel. The nationwide foreclosure crisis does not show up very clearly in the chart, but note that the chart includes only households that are in the process of foreclosure, not those for whom a foreclosure has been completed.
30
Anticipated mortgage distress did not improve between 2009 and 2011, as seen in the middle panels. Fewer homeowners reported being somewhat likely to fall behind on their mortgage payments in 2011 as compared with 2009 (seen on the left) but, for most groups, there was a commensurate increase in the number of homeowners that reported being very likely to fall behind (seen on the right). That pattern is surprising because there are other reasons to think that the pool of potentially distressed highly indebted homeowners shrank: As shown in the lower panels, about a third of highly indebted homeowners moved between 2007 and 2011, and close to a fifth exited homeownership altogether.
In sum, the preliminary 2011 PSID data on mortgage distress do not paint a particularly encouraging picture. Although homeowners made some progress in repairing their balance sheets, they continued to anticipate a fair degree of difficulty servicing their loans-and that result is especially strong among households that had high ratios of mortgage debt to house value in 2007. Perhaps, though, the finding is not surprising given that macroeconomic conditions remained very weak.
How Much More Deleveraging is to Come?
One way to assess how much deleveraging is to come is to track the changes in homeowners' leverage over the past several years. Figure 9 presents such an exercise, showing the fraction of households within different groups that have 10 percent or more leverage (defined again as mortgage balances divided by home value) than they did in 2005. This benchmark does not have a theoretical justification (as discussed earlier, each household's optimal holdings of debt and assets will depend on many factors, including preferences and available rates of return) but can be useful if households generally thought they were in a comfortable financial position at that point. To be conservative, I assume generally that households would be satisfied to get within 10 percent of their 2005 leverage. Figure 9 shows that more than 60 percent of highly indebted homeowners living in boom states had at least 10 percent more leverage in 2011 than they had in 2005, presumably because the decline in house prices more than offset any reduction in mortgage debt for those households. To try to get a grasp of the quantitative significance of the deleveraging that is to come, Table 9 offers evidence on how much mortgage debt would need to be reduced to reduce the mortgage leverage ratios of the non-retired PSID homeowners to different benchmarks. The first column shows the debt reduction necessary to bring homeowners within 110 percent of the value of their leverage in 2005 (i.e. the same benchmark as used in Figure 9 ). About 63 percent of households were already lower than their benchmark in 2011. About 9 percent of the sample can get there with a fairly modest reduction in debt-equivalent to 3 months or less of pre-tax income. But 14 percent need to reduce debt by more than a year's worth of pre-tax income and 3 percent need to reduce debt by more than three years' worth of pre-tax income. This exercise shows that if this deleveraging were accomplished by saving alone, it could mean a fairly drastic cut in consumption for many years for a small but not negligible share of households.
Getting back to 2005 values of leverage might seem like a high bar for a lot of households.
31 However, anecdotal evidence is consistent with the view that many households would like to reduce their debt and also with the view that households feel like they have not made much, if any, progress. For example, in one survey of roughly 1000 U.S. adults between the ages of 25 and 65, 45 percent of respondents said that they felt their debt was too high relative to their income in July 2011 (Absolute Strategy Research, 2011) . The share was down a bit from the share a year earlier (47 percent) but up a bit from two years earlier (41 percent).
That said, columns 2 and 3 show the deleveraging needed to bring households in line with less strict benchmarks. Should homeowners be satisfied with an 80 percent mortgage loanto-value ratio, 86 percent of households need no further deleveraging and most of the remainder can get to the benchmark by reducing debt in the amount of less than a year's worth of pre-tax income. If homeowners only desire a 10 percent equity cushion, 93 percent are already at or below the target and most of the rest need to reduce debt by 6 months' or less worth of income. By these benchmarks, far less deleveraging is needed compared with the case where homeowners try to return to 2005 levels of leverage. Even so, they would require substantial cuts to consumption if the affected homeowners wished to achieve them through raising their saving alone for some limited time period.
Of course, households can reduce their leverage in other ways. They can sell their homes and using the proceeds to pay down mortgage debt, and they can default on their mortgage obligations. They can also achieve reduced leverage if their house price rises, although many households may be reluctant to count on such an outcome given the experience of the last decade.
Conclusion
The plunge in household prices between 2007 and 2009 left enormous scars on households' balance sheets. Many people who had taken advantage of rising home prices and easy credit conditions during the early to mid-2000s to borrow large amounts were left with considerable debt overhangs in the form of elevated debt-to-asset ratios. The estimates in this paper provide tentative evidence that the spending of such households has been especially weak-more so than would be expected based on a response to the decline in wealth alone. The most-indebted households also appear to have made fairly very limited progress repairing their balance sheets, suggesting that that their consumption could be weak for some time to coming.
Such an outcome likely depends on the mechanism through which the debt overhang is restraining their spending. Highly indebted households may be purposefully holding back their spending in order to return their leverage to what they perceive as more manageable levels. Alternatively, they may be unable to spend more because they are especially constrained from borrowing in the current environment of tight credit. In the latter case, one would expect more of a pick-up in consumption as credit conditions ease. More research is needed to discern the underpinnings of the relationship.
Returning to where the paper started, these results beg the question of why aggregate consumption has not been even weaker during the past couple of years. As discussed earlier, the aggregate saving rate is lower-not higher-than might be expected given the magnitude of the wealth losses alone. One possibility is that any increase in the saving rate associated with deleveraging is being offset by reduced saving by households that have the capacity to smooth their consumption in the face of temporary disruptions to their income. While the latter behavior supports the economy in the near-term, it also represents a "borrowing from the future" that will tend to make the recovery more protracted. Note. Median values expressed in nominal dollars. Calculations are weighted using the longitudinal weights provided by the PSID. All responding households from each wave are used, although, for some variables, such as consumption, net worth, and vehicle debt, some observations are missing because the household did not report full data for the variable or its components. ** Significant at 10 percent level, *** Significant at 5 percent level . Notes. In baseline specification, consumption, income and wealth changes are measured as 100*the difference in the inverse hyperbolic sine of consumption, income, and wealth, and leverage is measured as the ratio of mortgage debt to home value. In column (2), changes are measured as 100 times the difference ** Significant at 10 percent level, *** Significant at 5 percent level . Notes. In baseline specification, consumption, income and wealth changes are measured as 100*the difference in the inverse hyperbolic sine of consumption, income, and wealth, and debt service burden is measured as the ratio of mortgage debt service obligations to family income. In column (2), changes are measured as 100 times the difference divided by average family income from the 2005, 2007, and 2009 waves. Regressions also include a constant and control for head age, head education, level of income, and level of state unemployment rate. Sample includes only households with a complete set of interviews from 2005 through 2009. Regressions drop extreme outliers for debt service burden and, in columns (2) for the change in wealth relative to income. Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10 percent level, *** Significant at 5 percent level . Notes. In baseline specification, consumption, income and wealth changes are measured as the difference in the inverse hyperbolic sine of consumption, income, and wealth; debt service burden is measured as the ratio of mortgage debt service obligations to family income; and leverage is measured as the ratio of mortgage debt to home value. In column (2), changes are measured as 100 times the difference divided by average family income from the 2005, 2007, and 2009 waves. Regressions also include a constant and control for head age, head education, level of income, and level of state unemployment rate. Sample includes only households with a complete set of interviews from 2005 through 2009. Regressions drop extreme outliers for leverage and debt service burden and, in columns (2) for the change in wealth relative to income. Standard errors in parentheses. 
